INTRODUCTION
The lOlst Congress, responding to a stream of Supreme Court decisions that significantly eroded the rights and remedies of plaintiffs in employment discrimination actions, 1 passed the Civil Rights Act of 1990. 2 Congress sought not only to overrule these cases as they apply to future instances of discrimination, but also to nullify the effect of the holdings on past and pending cases. The statute's retroactive provisions stirred debate and disagreement as representatives grappled with concerns of fairness and constitutionality. 3 President Bush eventually vetoed the Act, 4 labeling it a "quota bill," and created an acrimonious standoff with Congress. Congress failed to override the veto. 5 Congress resurrected the Act in 1991, 6 and it became the focal 755 (1989) (holding that third parties challenging an affirmative action consent decree can bring a collateral action to challenge the settlement); Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 490 U.S. 900 (1989) (holding that the deadline for filing a challenge to a seniority system begins to run when the practice is adopted and not when workers are adversely impacted); Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989) (overruling Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) , by shifting the burden of proof to employees in disparate impact cases to show that an employer's practice is not a business necessity); Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (holding that an employer is not liable for making a biased employment decision as long as the same decision would have been made without the discriminatory factors). Congress' response also involved three earlier decisions: Crawford Fitting Co. v. J.T. Gibbons, Inc., 482 U.S. 437 (1987) 2035 [Vol. 90:2035 point of the nation's civil rights agenda. During the lengthy compromise process, lawmakers dropped the explicit retroactivity provisions and instead provided that the Act would be effective on its date of enactment. 7 This formulation leaves unclear whether the law applies retroactively to cases pending on the date of enactment or whether the Act only applies to cases arising thereafter. Unable to agree or compromise on this issue, Congress dodged the dilemma and left it to the federal courts for resolution. Since passage of the Act, federal courts have split on the issue. 8 A retroactive law "gives to preenactment conduct a different legal effect from that which it would have had without the passage of the statute." 9 Despite a general presumption against retroactive lawmaking, the Constitution does not prohibit Congress from applying civil statutes to cases arising prior to a law's enactment. 10 A statute may raise retroactivity issues in one of two ways: (1) when Congress explicitly makes the bill effective on a date prior to the date of enactment, as in the vetoed 1990 Act; and (2) when Congress makes the bill effective on its date of enactment and declines explicitly to state Additionally, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) has determined that the law does not reach pending cases, and in so doing has affected the outcomes of an estimated 400-500 pending cases. whether or not the bill should be applied to cases pending in the courts, as in the 1991 Act. In either instance, retroactive application nullifies the effect of contrary Court decisions, and inevitably one party or class of parties must bear the burden of this restructuring of rights and interests. The Supreme Court has generally approved of retroactivity in the first instance, 11 yet faced with the second type of retroactivity the Court has two conflicting presumptions, one denouncing retroactivity and one presuming retroactive effect. The Court has declined to resolve this conflict.
The controversy surrounding the question of retroactive application of the Civil Rights Act stems from the current conflict between the Supreme Court and Congress over the interpretation of federal statutes. In response to the Court's narrow interpretation of certain statutes, Congress has increasingly resorted to overruling those decisions it finds unfavorable. 12 This Note addresses the applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to cases pending on the Act's date of enactment. Part I discusses current Supreme Court doctrine on the issue. This Part finds that the Court has endorsed two conflicting views on retroactively applying statutes to pending cases and that the lower federal courts consequently lack a principled framework for dealing with retroactivity issues in the 1991 Act. Part II describes the battle over the Civil Rights Acts of 1990 and 1991 and the subsequent confusion over the enacted statute's reach. This Part finds that Congress provided conflicting textual guidance and useless legislative history, both of which fail to resolve the retroactivity issue. Part III rejects the use of a presumption to resolve the retroactivity question and instead provides an analytic framework for deciding the appropriate application of the Civil Rights Act. This approach acknowledges the potential dangers of retroactivity but requires courts to assess whether or not these risks should be determinative in the context of a given statute and cases arising under it. This Note concludes that courts should decide cases arising under the Act by applying the law in effect at the time of decision. Such application does not interfere with significant equitable or constitutional concerns, but rather promotes the goals of efficiency and fairness.
I. R.ETROACTIVITY DOCTRINE IN THE FEDERAL COURTS

'
When faced with an ambiguous law, courts often tum to the canons of construction, time-honored "rules of thumb" for statutory in- [Vol. 90:2035 terpretation. 13 Karl Llewellyn noted that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point," 14 and this observation holds true where retroactivity issues arise. The Supreme Court has endorsed a presumption that instructs judges to read statutes prospectively in the absence of legislative direction to the contrary, as well as a maxim that obligates courts to apply the law in effect at the time they render a decision. Section I.A presents the Supreme Court's doctrine on retroactivity, in which the clash of two distinct lines of cases demonstrates the tensions surrounding the issue. Section I.B discusses federal court interpretations of the Supreme Court's alternate approaches and concludes that the current doctrine is not only unworkable but also doctrinally unjustifiable. Section I.C discusses the historical bias against retroactive laws reflected in the presumption against retroactivity. This section reveals the flaws of this presumption, manifested in the canon requiring a clear statement from Congress on retroactivity. This Part concludes that, because the Court has endorsed two conflicting views on retroactively applying statutes to pending cases, the lower federal courts lack guidance for dealing with retroactivity issues in the 1991 Act.
A. The Court's Dueling Doctrines
The Supreme Court speaks with two voices when it comes to applying ambiguous statutes retroactively. On the one hand, the Court has long eschewed applying statutes retroactively in the absence of congressional direction. On the other hand, the Court has also ordered courts to apply the law in effect at the time of decision, an "ancient principle" 15 that necessarily results in retroactive application of statutes. This contradictory stance has caused confusion, and today confronts courts trying to resolve whether to apply the Civil Rights Act to pending cases.
The Court recently reasserted the presumption against retroactivity in Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 16 stating that "[r]etroactivity is not favored in the law" and that, as a result, "congressional enactments and administrative rules will not be construed (1988) . Canons can be used as intrinsic aids to gamer meaning from a statute's words (e.g., expressio unius, the inclusion of one thing indicates exclusion of the other), or they may direct a court to subject-matter oriented policy preferences (e.g., statutes should be interpreted to avoid constitutional conflicts Retroactivity concerns are not so easily resolved, however, because an alternate maxim commands courts to apply the law in effect at the time they render a decision. This competing presumption first arose in United States v. Schooner Peggy, 21 in which the Court had to decide whether to apply a newly enacted treaty to a pending case. Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Marshall said that "if subsequent to the judgment and before the decision of the appellate court, a law intervenes and positively changes the rule which governs, the law must be obeyed, or its obligation denied." 22 Since the treaty expressly mandated its application to pending cases, Marshall applied the law retroactively. The case, however, did not address whether a change in law could be applied to pending cases if there were no explicit language commanding that effect.
The by rejecting the "contention that a change in the law is to be given effect in a pending case only where that is the clear and stated intention of the legislature." 27 The Court stated that "even where the intervening law does not explicitly recite that it is to be applied to pending cases, it is to be given recognition and effect." 28 The case involved a desegregation suit brought by black parents against the city of Richmond. The district court, relying on common law, had awarded the plaintiff class attorneys' fees. 29 The appellate court reversed the award, stating that Congress, and not the courts, should authorize such fees. 30 However, during the pendency of the appeal, Congress enacted the Education Amendments of 1972, which granted federal courts the authority to award reasonable attorney's fees when appropriate in school desegregation cases. 31 The Supreme Court retroactively applied the attorney's fees statute, holding that "a court is to apply the law in effect at the time it renders its decision, unless doing so would result in manifest injustice or there is statutory direction or legislative history to the contrary." 32 The Court did not hold that courts must always apply new laws to pending cases but that, when the legislative history supports either position, there is implicit support for applying the statute to pending cases. 33 In this instance, the Court chose not to read "into the statute the very fee limitation that Congress eliminated. " Bradley stands for the proposition that laws will generally be applied retroactively unless Congress directs otherwise or if doing so will result in "manifest injustice." The Court sets forth three means of identifying "manifest injustice" that would preclude retroactive application of a law: (1) the nature and identity of the parties; (2) the nature of the rights affected; and (3) the impact of the change in law on preexisting rights. 35 This test may eliminate the inequities caused by application of a stringent antiretroactivity presumption. In Bradley, the Court found no manifest injustice. First, the litigation pitted a publicly funded governmental entity with vast resources against children who had been denied their constitutional right to nondiscriminatory education and who lacked the same ability to promote their interests. 36 Unlike a routine private lawsuit between individuals, the case involved plaintiffs acting as private attorneys general to enforce a policy upon which Congress placed high priority. 37 The Court analogized the situation in Bradley to that described in Schooner Peggy, where Chief Justice Marshall asserted that in areas of "great national concern[] ... the court must decide according to existing laws." 38 Second, in looking at the nature of the rights affected, the Court acknowledged that it would refuse to apply a change in law to a pending action where "to do so would infringe upon or deprive a person of a right that had matured or become unconditional." 39 The Court did not find, however, that the Richmond School Board had any matured or unconditional right to the public funds that would go to pay attorney's fees. 40 Third, the Court determined that the law did not impose new or unanticipated obligations on a party without notice. 41 The Board could have been responsible for attorney's fees under common law theories, and it was unlikely that the Board's actions would have been any different had the statute been in effect. 4 the Court carries out the legislative purpose by examining the equities involved in a particular case. Unfortunately, the Court has failed to offer any rationales for reconciling these conflicting rules of construction and has instead allowed them to coexist.
Attempts to distinguish the presumptions on the basis of their facts provide little guidance. To begin with, the presumptions are broad statements of legal principles whose wording implies that they are not fact-specific but rather intended to apply to all interpretive problems involving retroactivity. 44 Despite the different contexts in which these cases arise, the Court uses these presumptions without differentiating between administrative and statutory law cases. 45 Furthermore, the Court plucked the principles of Bradley and Bowen from precedent, without relying on the facts of prior cases as determinative. Not surprisingly, federal courts have largely divorced the holdings from their facts, and opinions often refer to either presumption simply as the ''Bradley" or ''Bowen" test. 46 Analysis of the presumptions is all the more difficult because the Court never explained why it chose the presumption it did, nor did it explain how to select between the presumptions. This lack of legal reasoning is one of the pitfalls inherent in a presumption: as a mechanically applied rule, it discourages analysis.
The In his concurrence, Justice Scalia pointed to the "irreconcilable contradiction" 51 between Bowen and Bradley and urged the Court to resolve the dispute by abolishing the Bradley rule and returning to the age-old tradition of prospective lawmaking. 52 Scalia's argument centered on discrediting the precedential support of the Bradley/Thorpe line of cases. 53 He described retroactivity as a policy "contrary to fundamental notions of justice," and thus not within the probable contemplation of legislators. 5 4 Overall, the Supreme Court has not only failed to resolve the controversy, but has also failed to dig underneath the weak foundations which uphold the presumptions. Presumptions are supposed to help judges resolve sticky situations, yet these presumptions lead courts into a veritable swamp of confusion. In the end, litigants pay for the confusion, finding themselves subject to federal courts' policy preferences.
B. Lower Federal Court Interpretations
The Supreme Court's two conflicting approaches force federal courts faced with the retroactivity dilemma to pick one presumption over the other, yet they have no guidance for choosing between the presumptions. Thus, federal courts possess broad discretion to justify their decisions with a Supreme Court-sanctioned solution. 62 As a result, hundreds of federally funded institutions were relieved of liability for discrimination. For instance, if only a college's financial aid office received money, the rest of the institution remained beyond the reach of Title IX.
In the Civil Rights Restoration Act, Congress quickly repudiated this narrow interpretation of Title IX by defining "program or activity" to include all of an institution's operations. Congress found that "certain aspects of recent decisions and opinions of the Supreme Court have unduly narrowed or cast doubt upon the broad application of" the civil rights laws. 63 As a result, Congress said, "legislative action is necessary to restore the prior consistent and long-standing executive branch interpretation ... of those laws as previously administered." 64 The Senate Report stated unequivocally that the Act was meant "to overturn the Supreme Court's 1984 decision in Grove City. " 65 Congress did not include any provision indicating that the Act should be applied retroactively or prospectively. 15 the court found a congressional purpose to overrule Grove City but no clear intent to apply the Act retroactively. 76 The court compared the Restoration Act to other congressional amendments in which Congress had expressly specified the Act's applicability to pending cases, and inferred that Congress would have explicitly applied the statute retroactively if it had so intended. 77 Additionally, the court reasoned that the Restoration Act did not revive pre-Grove City law but rather was a new law, to which Congress must clearly specify its intentions with regard to retroactive application. 78 Thus, in following the clear statement approach of Bowen, the court was not persuaded to apply an overruling law retroactively because that approach "implicitly treats Congress as a court of revision rather than as the law-making branch of the federal government." 79 After struggling to reconcile Bradley and Bowen, the De Vargas court opted to follow the Bowen line of cases and agreed with Justice Scalia's argument in Bonjorno that the presumption of prospective application of statutes finds extensive support in history. so In keeping with the premises of the clear statement rule endorsed in Bowen, the De Vargas court ignored legislative history; if Congress did not precisely spell out its intentions, the court would not read them into the statute. In contrast, the other circuits looked to legislative history and the statute's overriding purpose as a guide in order to most accurately implement the spirit of the legislation. These contrasting approaches in statutory construction taken by the federal courts mirror the competing presumptions. A determination of which presumption to apply necessarily reflects a court's approach to statutory construction, which in turn reflects deep-seated notions about the role of courts in a tripartite system. The opposite outcomes among the circuits reveals the unworkability of rules of construction lacking in content -the inevitable consequences of the existing Supreme Court doctrine. Before the Court follows Justice Scalia and adopts a strict antiretroactivity presumption for ambiguous statutes, the Court must determine exactly which values merit protection.
The Lussier court touched on the manifest injustice exception and found that no injustice would result from retroactive application of the Act. "The principle that statutes operate only prospectively, while judicial decisions operate retrospectively, is familiar to every law student. "8I This assertion reflects a historical bias against retroactive legislation which stretches from the Roman Code to the English jurisprudence of Coke and Blackstone and on into the American legal tradition. 82 The American legal system evolved from the assumption that courts find the law made by the legislature. 83 This strict dichotomy, in which courts discover the past and legislatures regulate the future, disfavors retroactive laws. However, as this section demonstrates, courts accept retroactivity in a wide array of situations, and its implementation often contributes to values central to the rule of law.
With the experience of tyranny behind them, the Framers of the Constitution feared the excesses of legislative power. 84 As a result, they drafted express prohibitions against ex post facto laws and bills of attainder 85 and forbade the states from impairing existing contractual obligations. 86 The Framers did not, however, forbid retroactive federal statutes, 87 and in fact courts regularly uphold explicit retroactive provisions 88 such as those found in the original version of the Civil Rights Act of 1990. 8 9 When Congress speaks clearly about its intent to apply a law retroactively, courts defer and the traditional resistance to retroactivity disappears. Through the years, opponents of explicitly 89. As a constitutional matter, courts have approved of retroactivity as a helpful legislative tool in a wide variety of situations. Retroactive curative laws are regularly upheld. These laws "repair the consequences of legal accident or mistake" by ratifying prior official conduct or by fixing an error in an administrative system. 2 NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND'S STATUTORY CoNSTRUCTlON § 41.01 (4th ed. 1986); Hochman, supra note 9, at 704. By permitting the legislature to correct statutory errors, courts fulfill the expectations of parties operating under the Jaw and ensure that government runs smoothly. Courts similarly defer to emergency legislation, where lawmakers are considered to be in the best position to promote public welfare during a crisis, such as wartime or economic depression. Id. at 698-700. Finally, tax legislation is often retroactive. See generally id. at 706-11. Outside of these regularly accepted contexts for retroactivity, the Court has also approved of retroactive laws which affect economic and social policy.
See infra note 92.
[Vol. 90:2035 retroactive provisions have challenged retroactive laws with the Due Process Clause, but to little avail. 90 Currently, the Court uses a minimal rationality standard 91 in cases of explicit retroactivity, a low level of scrutiny which nearly all retroactive laws overcome. 92 Despite the deference given to these explicitly retroactive laws, the Bowen presumption remains hostile to retroactivity in the context of ambiguous statutes. Justice Scalia's attacks on the Bradley presumption, along with the Court's recent intimations of antiretroactivity sentiment, suggest that the presumption of retroactivity may soon be severely limited, if not extinguished. Thus, a discussion of the values embodied in Bowen is particularly appropriate and timely.
The Bowen approach cannot be justified on constitutional or policy grounds. Although Bowen's clear-statement rule is cloaked in the guise of neutrality -making it appear as if the Court is taking a purely hands-off approach -the imppsition of the rule is itself a policy choice to avoid resolving statutory dilemmas. Such a policy creates a conundrum in which Congress leaves the issue to the courts, and the courts give back to Congress a task which it cannot complete. 93 The two branches pass the issue back and forth, without ever assessing its validity, impact, or necessity. "[W]hen Congress is unable to address a problem that arises within a statutory scheme and the Court continues to 'remand' the problem to Congress by operating in the clear-statement model, a substantive decision results without either institution's explicitly confronting the choices implicated in that decision." 94 In contrast, Bradley is not a clear-statement rule because its presumption can be thwarted by manifest injustice as well as by congressional intent. Although its presumption may be troubling, 95 Bradley's manifest injustice rule allows case-by-case adjudication, exactly the approach a clear-statement rule seeks to avoid. Courts typically invoke clear-statement rules to ensure that Congress deliberates issues which contain potential constitutional concerns. 96 By forcing Congress to provide definitive guidance, a clearstatement rule allows courts to avoid interpretive searches into statutory meaning when they feel that a law perches precariously near constitutional limits. 97 However, retroactive laws usually pass rational basis review, 98 reaffirming that retroactivity does not inherently pose a substantial threat to constitutional norms. Thus, constitutional due process concerns do not explain the disparity between the extreme deference given to explicit retroactivity and the resistance pitted against retroactive application of ambiguous statutes. 99 · The lack of a constitutional underpinning suggests that equity concerns really underlie the Bowen presumption. Perhaps this standard seeks to guard against potentially unfair results of retroactive laws, which can disrupt settled expectations, deprive parties of notice, and target vulnerable groups. too These are indeed valid concerns, but they simply do not arise in every statute. tot In fact, the Bradley presumption probably arose as an implicit recognition that, in some situations, retroactivity contains none of these risks and can serve legislative goals. Furthermore, these potential inequities can just as easily result from prospective laws, which can upset settled expectations, and retroactive judicial decisions, which may punish past behavior the defendant thought proper. to2
Moreover, the Bowen presumption fails to involve courts in any examination of the effects of particular laws and instead applies a stringent and unyielding test. Statutes differ in purpose and effect, yet the clear-statement rule treats them all identically. In certain cases, and Congress debated its application to the Civil Rights Act throughout the two years preceding the Act's passage. Section II.A describes the enactment of the Civil Rights Act, with a focus on retroactivity issues. Section II.B demonstrates that traditional and textual methods of statutory interpretation fail to resolve the retroactivity issue. Section II.C analyzes the lower federal courts' approaches in deciding whether the Civil Rights Act applies to pending cases. This Part demonstrates that Congress' ambiguity, along with the conflicting Supreme Court doctrine, has led to contradictory outcomes among the federal courts.
A. Passage of The Civil Rights Act
During the 1989 term, the Supreme Court issued a rapid-fire succession of decisions which chipped away at the rights and remedies of 26, 1990 , at A-9. Nonetheless, the Conference Report upheld the retroactivity provisions, explaining that "[t]he Supreme Court decisions overturned by this bill repudiated well-settled case law which protected American workers against employment discrimination. In the past year, hundreds of discrimination victims have had their claims dismissed, or their rights and remedies otherwise impaired, as a direct result of the application of these decisions." H.R.
Ultimately, the Senate failed -by one vote -to overrule the presidential veto. 121 The Civil Rights Act resurfaced and passed in 1991, the result of a lengthy series of compromises between civil rights advocates and leaders of business. 122 In the 1991 Act, retroactivity remained one of the numerous topics Congress considered in the negotiations with the Administration. Initially, the House version of the 1991 bill, H.R. 1, tied retroactive provisions to the dates of the Supreme Court decisions they overruled. 123 In an effort to make the bill palatable to the administration, Representative Brooks introduced a modified version of H.R. Since passage, the Senate Labor Committee has proposed overturning the damage caps for women, disabled people, and religious minorities. The Committee has also approved a bill to apply the Act to the Ward's Cove Packing Co., the company specifically exempted from any potential retroactive application in the 1991 Act. Albert R. Karr, Senate Panel Votes to End Lid on Damages, WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1992, at A3, A4.
133. President Bush claimed a victory and denied that the administration had buckled under congressional pressure: "We didn't cave. We worked out in a spirit of compromise a negotiated settlement where I can say to the American people, 'This is not a quota bill. Republicans who wanted the bill passed by the 1992 elections threatened to overrule Bush if a retroactivity and stated only that "the amendments made by this Act shall take effect upon enactment." 134 This intentionally vague section 135 has spawned massive confusion because it fails to resolve which cases fall under the Act's ambitious reach. 136 On November 21, 1991, the "date of enactment," 137 hundreds of cases were headed to trial, in the midst of trial, pending appeal, pending remand, and generally winding their way through the system. 138 Some of the cases were based on facts arising before 1989, and others arose during the window of time when the Supreme Court standards were law. 139 As the next section demonstrates, however, nothing in the legislative history or the statutory language indicates the proper judicial response to this dilemma.
Pursuant to the Bush administration's wishes, the Justice Department and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) have consistently opposed retroactive application of the Act. 140 Interestingly, however, the administration has not always been adamantly 138. It can take years for a Title VII case to get through the system. Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 576 F.2d 1157 (5th Cir. 1978), a case that began in 1965, prompted the court to state: "The length of litigation in complex Title VII class actions often rivals that of even the most notorious antitrust cases. In the instant case, we encounter another judicial paleolithic museum piece." 576 F.2d at 1168.
139. The Act could be construed to cover a number of variations. Another layer of complexity arises because the "date of enactment" draws an arbitrary line among causes of action. Clearly the Act applies to causes of action arising after November 21, 1991, but whether it applies to cases filed after the date of enactment that are based on pre-November 21 facts is unclear. Suppose an employee is allegedly fired on the basis of race on November 20, the day before enactment, and files a claim two months later. Which law applies, the Wards Cove test enunciated by the Supreme Court or the Griggs standard restored by the Act?
To resolve the retroactivity question, courts have three options. First, a court could apply the Act only to cases based on facts arising after November 21. Second, a court could apply the Act to all cases filed after November 21, regardless ·:if when the cause of action arose. Third, a court could apply the Act to cases filed before November 21 and still pending on that day.
140. The EEOC issued a policy directive stating that the agency would only apply the Act to cases arising after November 21, 1991. See supra note 8. The Justice Department has argued against applying the law retroactively in cases accusing the government of discrimination against federal employees. [Vol. 90:2035 opposed to retroactivity. Rather, government attorneys have argued for retroactive application of at least six similarly ambiguous statutes, winning millions of dollars for the government in the process. 141 In United States v. Peppertree Apartments, 142 a housing fraud case, the government successfully relied on Bradley in the Eleventh Circuit to argue that the Housing and Community Development Act should apply retroactively. The government won double damages as a result. When the case reached the Supreme Court, however, the government rescinded its previous position favoring retroactivity so as not to jeopardize its stance on the 1991 Act. 143 With hundreds of Civil Rights Act cases pending across the country, the government was unwilling to defend its position and in a short brief abandoned its claim. 144 The Court vacated the appellate court judgment. 145 Not surprisingly, civil rights attorneys accused the government of taldng contradictory positions, "depending on whether endorsing or repudiating Bradley will result in the preferred outcome." 146 The retroactivity issue will likely be resolved in the context of one of the cases interpreting the Civil Rights Act of 1991. ·
B. The Impossible Search for Statutory Meaning
Both the Bowen and Bradley presumptions hinge on congressional intent. In the absence of intent, Bowen presumes prospectivity, while Bradley presumes retroactivity. 147 Thus, any court examining the Civil Rights Act must undertake a search for intent, under which either presumption may be rebutted. Under the traditional method of statutory construction, courts attempt to discern the intention of the enacting legislature by looking to the plain language of the statute, the legislative history, and legislative purposes. 148 Recently, Justice Scalia has revived discourse over the textual method of statutory construction, under which courts ignore legislative history and derive meaning purely from the statute's words. 149 As this section demonstrates, neither of these methods of interpretation aids in resolving the confusion engendered by section 402 of the Civil Rights Act. Congress simply could not decide whether to apply the Act either retroactively or prospectively.
Statutory Language
here the congressional intent is clear, it governs." 150 Despite differences in their theoretical groundings, both the traditional means of statutory interpretation and the textualist approach look first to the plain meaning of a statute's words to divine congressional intent. 151 A purposely ambiguous statute like the Civil Rights Act confounds this search for plain meaning. Judges have attacked the effective date provision of the Civil Rights Act for its vague and inconclusive language152 but have nonetheless been able to select the presumption of their choice by finding no clear congressional intent compelling the opposite result. Both proponents and opponents of retroactively applying the Civil Rights Act to pending cases can draw suggestive inferences from the statutory text. Ultimately, both sets of arguments fail because they rely on finding intent, and none exists on the retroactivity issue.
Opponents of retroactivity claim that if Congress wanted retroac-148. See, e.g., Griffen v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 570 (1982) ("Our task is to give effect to the will of Congress."). Under the traditional approach, a court will first attempt to discern legislative intent from the statute's words. The court will then look to legislative history to give content to the language and to either confirm or rebut the implications of the plain mean- 151. Each of the two approaches finds support in Cardoza-Fonesca, 480 U.S. at 421, in which the majority used the traditio11:tl approach while Scalia, in his concurrence, relied solely on the text and steadfastly refused to look to legislative history. Scalia relied on the "venerable principle that if the language of a statute is clear, that language must be given effect -at least in the absence of a patent absurdity." 480 U.S. at 452. [Vol. 90:2035 tive application of the statute, Congress would have explicitly said so. 153 This line of argument maintains that Congress knows how to make its laws retroactive when it wants to. 154 However, Congress also knows how to make its laws strictly prospective and has done so on numerous occasions. 155 It is difficult to glean anything meaningful from these contentions since Congress knowingly left the matter to the courts. 156 Alternatively, proponents of retroactivity point out that the Act specifically exempts certain provisions from retroactive treatment. 157 Section 109(c), which extends the reach of the Act overseas, states that its provisions "shall not apply with respect to conduct occurring before the date of ... enactment." 158 Also, section 402(b), the controversial exemption for the defendants in the Wards Cove case, specifically protects the company from retroactive application of the Act and insulates it from any potential lawsuits. 159 Under general principles of construction, a statute should not be construed as redundant. 160 If the whole Act is prospective, these exemptions would be superfluous; thus, these exemptions suggest that the rest of the Act is retroactive. In rebuttal, opponents maintain that these provisions merely ensure that congre8sional intent is not mistaken as to these specified parties, and further that these sections reflect an overall antiretroactivity bias. For instance, the Department of Justice argued that "Congress was simply trying to assuage the Wards Cove defendants who, for whatever rea- 156. "It will be up to the courts to determine the extent to which the bill will apply to cases and claims that are pending on the date of enactment. Yet another analysis compares the ambiguous language of Section 402 of the 1991 Civil Rights Act with the deleted explicit retroactivity provisions of the 1990 version. On the one hand, the deletion signals that Congress disapproved of retroactive application of the Act to pending cases. On the other hand, that Congress failed to expressly deny retroactivity implies that it sanctioned retroactivity in certain instances.
As becomes clear, the problem with these strategic textual arguments is that both sides have valid contentions. The textual clues prove little. Congress not only lacked unanimous intent but very simply did not know what it wanted. There is no intent to be foundother than the intent to leave the problem to the courts.
Legislative History
Congress knew that the Act's application to pending cases remained unresolved. In fact, senators and representatives went to great lengths to put their own spin on the matter into the legislative history. In the House, Representative Edwards stated that "[t]he intent of the sponsors is that this language be given its normal effect, and that the provisions of the bill be applied to pending cases." 162 In the Senate, Senators Dole and Danforth supported the administration's position and each submitted a memorandum of law into the Congressional Record arguing against retroactivity. 163 Senator Kennedy, however, responded to these memoranda by asserting that he only agreed to be a cosponsor of the bill with the understanding that "[i]t will be up to the courts to determine the extent to which the bill will apply to cases and claims that are pending on the date of enactment." 164 Kennedy characterized the bill as a "restoration of a prior rule," and cited cases which applied restored rules retroactively. 165 As a result of these contrary pronouncements, federal courts may support either view after an obligatory search through the legislative history.166
President Bush also attempted to inject his own voice into the legislative history. In his presidential signing statement, Bush said that Dole's interpretive memorandum covers all technical matters, such as the effective date, and "will be treated as authoritative interpretive guidance by all officials in the executive branch. the balance for courts fed up with the congressional confusion. 168
In the end, the only clear meaning which comes out of the enactment provision is that Congress could not come to a consensus. The "declarations and counter-declarations" 169 in the legislative history fail to guide courts convincingly in either direction. Whether a court construes statutes by looking at "plain meaning" or by relying on extrinsic aids such as legislative history, the application of the Act to pending cases remains ambiguous. Thus, attempts to divine meaning from these weak inferences will avoid the underlying and most meaningful issue: why should or should not the Act be applied retroactively?
C. Cases Interpreting the Civil Rights Act
The first federal appellate court to address the retroactivity issue declined to apply the Act to pending cases. In Vogel v. City of Cincinnatl 170 a split Sixth Circuit panel stated that "[w]e ... shall not attempt to interpret the substantive provisions of the 1991 Act; rather we shall apply the law that was in effect prior to the 1991 Act." 171 In Vogel, the court affirmed summary judgment against a white male who brought a reverse discrimination suit against the Cincinnati police department. The plaintiff claimed that the department's affirmative action policy, enacted pursuant to a consent decree negotiated between the police and the Department of Justice, discriminated against him in favor of minority and women candidates. 172 Although the plaintiff eventually joined a later recruit class, he sued for back pay, retroactive seniority, and other benefits. 173 The court felt it had to address the retroactivity question as a "preliminary matter."174
In reaching its decision, the court first acknowledged that retroactivity was an open question and briefly recited the applicable case law of Bradley, Bowen, and Bonjorno. 175 The Court found that the language and legislative history of the Act were unclear and that, as a result, district courts were divided on the issue. 176 The court chose to 168 The court also reasoned that prospective application of the Act was consistent with a recent Sixth Circuit case which had applied Bowen. 1 7 9 The court recognized that the Circuit had often cited Bradley as the controlling provision, but stated that Bradley should be narrowly construed and not applied in contexts where " 'substantive rights and liabilities' ... would be affected." 180 Without any explanation, the court announced that "clearly, retroactive application of the 1991 Act would affect 'substantive rights and liabilities' of the parties to this action." 181 The court then applied pre-1991 law and determined that Vogel lacked standing to enforce the consent decree collaterally . 182 The concurring judge declined to join the holding on the retroactivity of the Act because the issue had not been raised, briefed, or argued by the parties. 183 Whether application of the 1991 Act would have changed the court's ultimate resolution of the issue, or even why the court felt compelled to address the retroactivity question, remains unclear. Regardless, the court's reasoning fails to justify its conclusion.
Several courts dealing with retroactive application of ambiguous statutes have grasped onto a substance/procedure distinction. 184 The Vogel court's assertion that "substantive rights and liabilities" would 177 be affected by application of the Civil Rights Act reflects this approach. These courts have seized on some language in the Supreme Court's retroactivity opinions to infer a substance/procedure distinction, 185 under which substantive changes in the law are applied prospectively while procedural or remedial changes are applied retroactively. The courts may be using this distinction as a shorthand way of balancing the potential dangers of retroactivity, tying these dangers to substantive laws while minimizing them for procedural laws.
However, this approach suffers from shortcomings. No consensus has emerged on what comprises substance or procedure, revealing the lack of content in the distinction. 186 For instance, in characterizing provisions of the Civil Rights Act, one court stated, " [t] here can be no dispute that a right to seek compensatory damages in a jury trial is a major substantive provision," 187 while another court stated, "compensatory damages and jury trial, are not substantive rights . . . these rights are remedies and procedural rights." 188 The lack of content to the distinction leaves courts without adequate guidance on how to characterize a particular interest and allows policy preferences to determine outcomes. Consequently, similar cases end up with opposite results, making the entire doctrine unpredictable. Courts must grope to distinguish between objectionable and acceptable effects of retroactivity. The substance/procedure distinction blurs the analysis. 189 The Eighth Circuit also applied the law prospectively in 186. In Bonjorno, Scalia particularly disdained drawing the line in this manner: I suppose it would be possible to distinguish between statutes that alter "substantive rights and liabilities" directly, and those that do so only by retroactively adding a procedural re· quirement, the failure to comply with which alters the "substantive rights and liabilities" -but I fail to see the sense in such a distinction. sion, section 1981 claims only apply to the making and enforcement of contracts, and not to later employment practices. 1 9 2 Relying on Patterson, the defendant moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion and the section 1981 claim was tried before a jury, which awarded the plaintiff damages. The case was pending appeal when the 1991 Act took effect. After a lengthy analysis of Bradley and Bowen, and an acknowledgement that the effective date provision is unclear, the appellate court nonetheless avoided choosing between the presumptions by finding evidence of congressional intent to apply the law prospectively. 193 The court found it dispositive of legislative intent that the 1991 Act eliminated the explicit retroactive provisions of the vetoed 1990 bill.194
The dissenting judge attacked the finding of a clear congressional directive, stating that the elimination of the 1990 Act's explicit retroactivity provision "is dispositive merely of Congress'[ ] intent to leave the retroactivity decision to the courts." 195 Rather than choosing between the presumptions, the dissent felt that the court should reconcile the presumptions as much as possible. 196 Bradley and Bowen share a common thread, the dissent argued, because both are based on an overriding concern for fairness. 197 Thus, the dissent engaged in a fairness analysis which stressed that all the alleged discriminatory conduct occurred before the Court's 1989 decision: "Until the Supreme trary and patchwork manner undermines the federal statutory mandate for a national antidiscrimination policy.
III. A FRAMEWORK FOR REsOLVING RETROACTIVITY ISSUES IN
THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991 This Part proposes a framework for courts to use in determining whether the Civil Rights Act should apply to pending cases. In order to discern the law in the absence of specific congressional directives, courts need a principled basis for making retroactivity decisions, rather than contradictory canons of construction. A principled approach recognizes the legitimate dangers of retroactivity but acknowledges that these dangers are not always present. Such an approach also captures the norms favored by principled decisionmaking -those of efficiency and fairness.
Section III.A argues that the federal courts have the authority to fill in the gaps left by the Civil Rights Act and therefore do not need to demand clear statements from Congress. Section III.B proposes a principled approach to resolving indeterminate questions of retroactive application. This approach requires courts to assess the effects of retroactivity inherent in a specified statutory scheme. Section III.C then analyzes the Civil Rights Act according to this framework and concludes that because the Civil Rights Act does not implicate any dangers of retroactivity, the Act should apply to cases pending on the date of the statute's enactment.
A. Judicial Authority To Fill in Statutory Gaps
On the issue of the Civil Rights Act's retroactive applicability, Congress clearly and knowingly left a gap in the statute. 206 As part of the hurried compromise process, Congress left many issues unresolved and in so doing delegated decisionmaking authority to the courts. 207 This is a common legislative result because "[a]ll statutes are compromises, and the cornerstone of many a compromise is the decision, usually unexpressed, to leave certain issues unresolved." 208 Courts often act as gap fillers by giving meaning to ambiguous provisions. In The clear statement rule for retroactivity, beyond being unjustifiable on constitutional due process grounds, 210 fails to recognize inherent limits in legislative reality and demands that Congress reach an accord which may be impossible. Although it would be preferable for Congress to clearly state each and every one of its intentions, the institutional limits on Congress prevent legislators from writing statutes with the meticulous specificity that would eliminate ambiguities. 211 Many statutory gaps are unconscious and result from congressional neglect, ambiguous language, 212 or unforeseen consequences. In contrast, the gap left by the Civil Rights Act results from a conscious decision by Congress to duck the issue and thereby leave resolution to the federal courts. 213 Congress knew that its silence would force the issue to the judiciary. 214 Legislators' numerous attempts to get their views in the legislative history reveal that Congress knew the courts would eventually deal with the issue.
Congress' delegation makes sense because retroactivity is a courtcreated doctrine, developed through cases such as Bradley and Bowen. 215 The incremental development of the common law has provided conflicting presumptions on retroactive application of ambiguous statutes. 216 In general, presumptions should embody background assumptions against which lawmakers operate. 217 To rebut these assumptions and break with the status quo, legislators must provide explicit directives.
In the Civil Rights Act, however, Congress knew that two contradictory background assumptions operated in the face of congressional silence. Some representatives and senators urged courts to invoke Bradley, 218 while others hoped that Bowen would be the operative presumption. 219 There is a background assumption neither of retroactivity nor prospectivity, and thus both presumptions have lost their effectiveness as interpretive tools. Neither side in the retroactivity debate could gamer enough votes to prevail, yet the presumptions allow a particular view to win merely by default. By providing lawmakers with conflicting signals, courts must defer to Congress' wishes and unravel the doctrine. Rather than applying the existing presumptions, courts should give content to the ambiguous provision by using the proposed analysis.
Courts regularly accept gap-filling responsibilities in the face of silence resulting from congressional oversight. This gap-filling role becomes even more compelling when Congress has consciously delegated the decisionmaking authority to the courts. Interpretation of ambiguous statutes does not entail unwarranted judicial discretion. Rather, in an "age of statutes," 220 courts regularly settle statutory ambiguities by filling in gaps inevitably left by the legislature. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the judicial role in filling statutory gaps: "We often must legislate interstitially to iron out inconsistencies within a statute or to fill gaps resulting from legislative oversight or to resolve ambiguities resulting from a legislative compromise." 221 Judges should be able to "fill[] the open spaces in the law" 222 and make a "fresh choice between open altematives." 223 The need for judicial resolution of statutes recurs time and again. Almost all complex modem day statutes contain ambiguous provi- (Vol. 90:2035 sions that the judiciary must eventually resolve. Statutes as varied as RIC0, 224 section 1983,2 25 the Sherman Act, 22 6 and Title VII 22 7 demand judicial intervention and expertise to resolve the definition of terms, burdens and methods of proof, possible defenses, and other unsettled issues. Courts have not declined to resolve these open questions by sending these issues back to Congress and thereby curtailing the interpretive process. Instead, they have used their decisionmaking authority to give content to these statutes. 228 Like most statutory interpretation cases, the decisions overruled by the Act resulted from the Court's gap-filling role. The Supreme Court did not demand clear statements when assessing Title VII, the law amended by the Act. Rather, the court interpreted, analyzed, and resolved tough statutory questions under its judicial authority. 22 9 As Professor Sunstein notes, "[m]uch of the law of Title VII is an unavoidable, and legitimate, norm-ridden exercise in developing gap-filling rules." 230 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 demands no less. By relying on a clear-statement rule, the judiciary may adversely affect the development of the law: "[I]n a system of law whose moral growth over time is grounded on the concept of reasoned elaboration, the failure of articulation presages moral stagnation of the law." 231 A court should not decline to exercise judicial discretion in interpreting the Civil Rights Act, as the statute is meant to overturn the Title VII interpretations of an activist Court.23 2
B. An Approach for Resolving Retroactivity Dilemmas
This section proposes a solution to the retroactivity dilemma. The proposed approach does not select either of the presumptions as determinative. The weaknesses of the clear-statement rule expressed in Bowen have already been exposed. 2 33 Several courts have seized on the Bradley rule because it does not mandate a result and allows a court to employ the "manifest injustice" test to alleviate fairness concerns. However, each presumption relies on a legal fiction to attribute to legislators an intent they do not have, a fiction dramatically illustrated by the Civil Rights Act. The Supreme Court never illuminated any method of deciding between the presumptions, most likely because no rational dividing line exists. Moreover, the Court variably applied the presumptions without justification, and the lack of legal reasoning has left lower courts adrift.
A preferable analysis would approach the Civil Rights Act without any false and preconceived notions about legislative intent. Instead of providing a presumption, this approach requires courts to make a reasoned judgment. Under this Note's proposed framework, a court must determine whether applying the statute at issue to a given case implicates any of the dangers of retroactivity: unsettling expectations, depriving parties of notice, or targeting vulnerable groups. 234 If these concerns arise, a court should decline to apply a statute to pending cases. If these concerns fail to materialize, a court should apply the law to pending cases.
The predictable effects of this approach are that statutes regulating new areas will usually be applied prospectively, while statutes which overrule court decisions are more likely to be applied retroactively. This schism results because statutes regulating new areas may carry with them more of the potential dangers of retroactivity than a statute like the Civil Rights Act, which restores expectations. Accordingly, in their deliberations over the Restoration Act, the federal courts recognized that restorative statutes were less likely to raise serious retroactivity concerns. 235 This proposal is not a radical restructuring of retroactivity precedent. It recognizes the legitimate dangers of retroactivity addressed by Bowen, while concurrently allowing the deliberative approach of Bradley. This method simply eliminates the irreconcilable conflict between Bradley and Bowen by allowing courts to reach the heart of the retroactivity debate. In other words, rather than engaging in a useless debate over which presumption to apply, courts focus on actual objections to retroactivity and whether these objections inhere in a particular statute. This inquiry will lead to. well-reasoned and inherently more just opinions. 23 6
C. The Civil Rights Act in Action
This section analyzes the 1991 Civil Rights Act according to the proposed framework. This analysis reveals not only that the risks of retroactive lawmaking are absent in the Civil Rights Act, but also that retroactive application of the Act promotes the dual goals of efficiency and fairness. 234 . See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 235. See supra section I.B. 236. Courts will not necessarily agree in their conclusions, but the decisions will be betterreasoned as judges confront the real issues implicated by retroactive statutes.
The Civil Rights Act Does Not Implicate the Dangers of Retroactivity
a. The Act restores expectations. By attaching new consequences to past acts, retroactivity can upset reliance interests. 237 However, our system does not insulate all reliance interests since "the legal order must constantly change to fit new factual conditions or new conceptions of the common good." 238 Both judicial decisionmaking and prospective lawmaking also inevitably alter expectations. Yet the American legal system does not protect all interests from change, because to do so would freeze the law forever. 239 Thus, where the impact of a retroactive law ranges no further than that accepted for prospective laws or judicial decisions, the law fits within the reasonable limits of our system.
Prospective laws can alter preexisting legal relations by creating new rights and duties. Even purely prospective application of the Civil Rights Act will require employers to conform their actions to its mandates. 240 This may require a restructuring of hiring, firing, and promotion practices, along with other workplace norms. Yet this disruption is rightly accepted as necessary to effectuate national policy. One commentator has noted the disparity in treatment between retroactive and prospective laws: "The guardians of expectations can neither locate the dividing line nor satisfactorily explain why only those expectations under attack from the retroactive side are deserving of protection." 241 The degree of the disruption, not whether the disruption comes from a retroactive law, should be the determinative factor.
237. "To say that one has relied on a law is to say that, at some previous moment or mo- Furthermore, retroactivity is the norm in judicial decisionmaking, where court decisions regularly apply to past, completed acts. The assumption that judicial decisions apply retroactively arises from a conception that courts simply find preexisting law in analyzing statutes -because the law always existed, there is no retroactivity involved in applying the law to past actions. 242 This conception has been largely discredited; 243 in fact, most of the academic discourse on judicial retroactivity has focused on finding exceptions to judicial retroactivity through prospective decisionmaking. 244 Thus, the same objections aimed at retroactive statutes can also to varying degrees be leveled at judicial retroactivity. The "individual who is affected by judge-made law has no notice of what is coming and suffers without redress. " 245 When Congress restores the unsettling effects of unexpected judicial decisions, it provides stability and continuity to the law, while engaging in a valuable dialogue with the judiciary.
Judicial rule-making does include a retroactive element analogous to that present in legislation when th~ effect of a decision is to overrule past decisions or widely accepted lay or administrative interpretations of the law. The overruled interpretations provide a status quo upon which reliance may have been based. The unsettling effect can be quite pronounced in those relatively infrequent cases in which the court's decision is almost totally unexpected. In these situations, retroactive legislation designed to restore the status quo may be appropriate. 2 46 Finding the line between reasonable and unreasonable disruption of expectation interests ultimately turns on Congress' judgment. After factfinding, analysis, and considerable deliberation, Congress determined that amendments to Title VII were necessary to restore prior understandings of the statute. As long as Congress' determination that the Act restores interests has a rational basis, courts should defer to Congress. Despite many ambiguities in the Civil Rights Act, 24 7 the [Vol. 90:2035 overriding purpose of the law is clear. Congress minces no words in noting that the Act will "respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes." 248 Congress specifically attacks the Wards Cove decision by stating that it "weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections"249 and that as a result additional legislation is necessary to protect against discrimination. The Act is thus a direct rebuff of Supreme Court interpretations.
Like most broadly written statutes, Title VII lends itself to divergent interpretations. Its ambiguities suggest that courts will rarely agree on the interpretation of a given provision or that Congress, if Congress can even be said to possess a single intent, will always feel that courts are getting it exactly right. However, Congress has the last word on the interpretation of its statutes, and its overruling of statutory decisions serves as a check on the courts. 250 Accordingly, Congress' perception of court interpretations should accordingly be given considerable weight. Although the controversial Court decisions fell on the possible spectrum of interpretations, they generally fell on an extreme end. Even the conservative opponents of the Civil Rights Act proposed an alternative bill which would have overruled two of the more unexpected Court decisions. 251 Given a choice between reading the provisions expansively or narrowly, the Court generally took the more restrictive view. 252 As in all problems of interpretation, the Court had choices, and it exercised its legitimate authority by choosing options which generally aided defendants. In Congress' judgment, these choices strayed too far afield from the underlying spirit of Title VII.
In overruling the 1989 decisions, Congress restored the values and understandings developed over twenty-five years of federal court interpretations. These long-standing expectation interests and their subsequent reaffirmance by Congress outweigh the interests which arose during the two-year break from the past. Essentially a windfall gain for employers, those decisions disrupted expectations to a far greater degree than the restorative Civil Rights Act. The Act does not unsettle expectations to a degree above and beyond that tolerated in a dynamic system of laws.
The Court's opinion in Wards Cove made it extremely difficult for employees to press and prevail on a disparate impact claim. In explaining its reasoning, the Court admitted that "some of our earlier decisions can be read as suggesting [the law was] otherwise" but that such a reading was in error. 253 One commentator observed wryly, "of course the 'error' had been committed by Congress, both plaintiffs' and defendants' Title VII attorneys, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, every lower federal court, and the leading commentators. " 254 In the continuing dialogue between the Court and Congress, retroactivity can restore "settled" expeptations by diminishing the effect of Court decisions which stray too far from statutory purposes.
b. Retroactive application of the Act does not deprive parties of notice. Employers may claim that without notice of the change in Supreme Court doctrine, they were unable to plan their conduct accordingly. However, this argument fails to acknowledge that the substantive right not to be discriminated against never wavered. The Court did not sanction discrimination, but limited methods and burdens of proof, and generally reduced the effectiveness of the laws. 255 The Court made successfully bringing and winning a discrimination action harder, but it did not make discrimination legal. Notice is only a bar to retroactive laws if people would have changed their behavior in light of the new rule. It is difficult to believe that employers knowingly engaged in discriminatory behavior in reliance on the 1989 standards and, if true, impossible to endorse. One district court rejected a defendant's attempt to avoid retroactive application of the Act by noting, "the court finds it unlikely defendant would have acted differently 253 had it known its full potential liability." 256 Another district court stated that even if the defendant would have changed its behavior, "[t]he law has never countenanced that an employer may weigh the legal consequences of his discrimination and choose to continue his unlawful conduct. An employer cannot pay for the right to discriminate because no such 'right' has ever existed." 257 Since Title VII was enacted, employers have been on continual notice that discriminatory practices are subject to lawsuits. In many cases, the actions forming the basis of discrimination claims occurred before 1989. 258 To deprive plaintiffs of the Act's remedies and restored legal standards would give defendants an unwarranted windfall gain. Applying the Act retroactively to pending cases will actually protect the interests that arose before 1989 and that are attached to cases still winding through the system. For such cases, it is impossible to argue that retroactive application disturbs expectation interests or deprives parties of notice. " [T] here is little injustice in retroactively depriving a person of a right, however valuable, which was created contrary to his bona fide expectations at the time he entered the transaction from which the right arose." 259 Furthermore, many alleged discriminatory acts, such as sexual harassment and failure to promote, continue over extended periods of time, making it impossible to pinpoint the exact moment of a statutory violation. These employment practices may have overlapped from the pre-1989 period into 1989-1991 period. Applying the overruled standards to these cases would allow employers to escape liability for long-term discriminatory practices merely because some of their actions occurred during the window of time when the Supreme Court standards were in effect.
The Act does go beyond the scope of the original Title VII by providing additional damage remedies and a jury trial option. Yet objections to these provisions are unavailing because employers do not have an entrenched right to preserve particular procedures or remedies. The rules in a heavily regulated area are constantly subject to change. The Supreme Court has stated, "[t]hose who do business in the regulated field cannot object if the legislative scheme is buttressed by subsequent amendments to achieve the legislative end. " 260 The amendments to Title VII in the Act serve to strengthen an existing statutory scheme; for this reason, defendants have no "unconditional right to limit plaintiffs to a particular type of remedy." 261 One district court specifically rejected a challenge to the "new" provisions in the Civil Rights Act in a suit alleging discrimination in failure to promote on the basis of national origin.
[R]etroactive application of [the Act] will not affect existing rights or give rise to new unanticipated obligations imposed upon any party without notice or an opportunity to be heard. The parties retain their due process rights to fully litigate the issues, the only difference is that [plaintiff] will now be entitled to a jury trial on the issues of intentional discrimination and compensatory damages (a right long guaranteed in most litigation by the Constitution and jealously guarded in the law) and to be fully compensated for any harm she suffered by reason of discrimination. By the same token, Defendant retains all its rights not to be subjected to liability, unless and until [plaintifi] ... bear[s] the burden of proof 262 Finally, employers were on notice that the Court's decisions engendered a huge amount of controversy. Almost immediately after the decisions were announced, Congress introduced legislation to overturn the decisions, and activity on Capitol Hill was widely publicized. 263 The 1989 decisions were in question almost immediately after the Court issued them, putting employers on notice that the law was still unsettled and subject to change. Legislatures are primarily policymaking bodies that promulgate rules to govern future conduct. The constitutional prohibitions against the enactment of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder reflect a valid concern about the use of the political process to punish or characterize past conduct of private citizens. It is the judicial system, rather than the legislative process, that is best equipped to identify past wrongdoers and to fashion remedies that will create the conditions that presumably would have existed had not wrong been committed. 264 These concerns fail to surface in the Civil Rights Act, which applies to employers at large and does not target any specific group or industry. 265 While cause for suspicion would certainly arise if the Act targeted a vulnerable group, the nation's employers hardly qualify as a defenseless entity. Employers expressed a strong voice during the shaping of the Act, and their lobbyists played an integral role in compromise negotiations. 266 Additionally, the President and conservative members of Congress pushed a probusiness agenda and on the retroactivity issue continue to do so, along with the EEOC and the Department of Justice. 267 Overall, Congress granted business concerns extensive consideration and allowed them a central role in shaping the Act.26s
Applying the Civil Rights Act to Pending Cases Promotes Fairness and Efficiency
Finally, application of the Act to pending cases best achieves fairness and efficiency. Courts presently must decide who should bear the costs of congressional indecision, plaintiffs or defendants. Congress 264. 488 U.S. 469, 513-14 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (footnote omitted}.
265. The only targeting was aimed at the Wards Cove Packing Company, and it received a special interest exemption from the entire Act. See supra note 134.
266. For instance, in shaping the modified version ofH.R. 1, concessions were made to make the bill "more palatable to President Bush, congressional Republicans, and the business commu- clearly meant to protect plaintiffs who utilize the Civil Rights Act and effectuate the national policy against workplace discrimination. Yet to disallow retroactivity imposes costs of congressional inaction on the very class of parties most entitled to protection and least likely to be able to shoulder the cost. The Supreme Court has previously sanctioned placing the costs of retroactive legislation on employers. In Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 269 the Court upheld federal mine legislation that required mine operators to pay disability benefits to miners affiicted with black lung disease, including miners who had left employment before the passage of the law. The Court supported retroactive liability as "a rational measure to spread the costs of the employees' disabilities to those who have profited from the fruits of their labor." 270 Such an approach is eminently fair for the Civil Rights Act. It places the costs on the beneficiaries of discriminatory behavior.
Moreover, to deny retroactive application of the Act to pending cases would also mean that, for years to come, two different standards would apply to discrimination claims. Representative Edwards revealed this anomaly: "[O]ne set of decisions would explicate law as Congress has enacted it, and the other would further develop fine points of the law under Wards Cove, Patterson, Lorance, Price Waterhouse, etc., long after Congress has repudiated these decisions."271 Promulgating unnecessary standards would be a tremendous waste of judicial resources. Courts would spend time researching and refining rejected legal standards rather than developing institutional expertise in applying the current law. It is more efficient for courts to focus on carrying out the purpose of the Civil Rights Act than to keep repeating the mistakes that Congress overruled. To effectuate the statutory purpose, courts should concentrate on interpreting the existing law and not on belaboring interpretations that Congress rejected. [Vol. 90:2035 mered out its policy against workplace discrimination during two years of extensive negotiation, and debates over applying the Act to past and pending cases remained particularly controversial. Although the 1990 Act contained an explicit retroactivity provision, Congress dropped this provision during the compromise process. Knowing the courts would ultimately address the issue, Congress sacrificed statutory specificity in order to ensure the bill's passage. Courts, however, have been equally incapable of reaching a consensus on the Act's applicability. The confusion is an inevitable result of the Supreme Court's schizophrenic doctrine. Two competing canons of construction govern retroactivity -one presumes retroactivity while the other presumes prospectivity. ·Thus, precedent fails to provide a workable framework for interpreting statutes that are ambiguous as to their retroactive application. Rather than resolving the tension between the presumptions, courts should focus on the potential effects of retroactive statutes. Under this approach, courts screen for the potential dangers of retroactivity, ensuring that a statute does not unduly upset settled expectations, deprive parties of notice, or target vulnerable groups.
CONCLUSION
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 does not implicate any of the concerns that make retroactivity potentially undesirable. The Act restores prior understandings of Title VII while promoting the goals of fairness and efficiency. When Congress enacted the Restoration Act of 1987 to clarify prior legislation, the majority of courts deferred to the legislative intent and applied the new Act retroactively to pending cases. Like the Restoration Act, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 remedies restrictive court interpretations of civil rights laws. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 reaffirms the principles embodied in Title VII, and only retroactive application of the Act can fulfill the Court's obligation to effectuate legislative intent by eradicating discrimination from the American workplace.
